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INTERNATIONAL LAW, POLITICS, DIPLOMACY AND THE
ABOLITION OF THE DEATH PENALTY
William A. Schabas*
On June 10, 2003, L. Paul Bremer signed Coalition Provisional Authority Order
Number 7 decreeing the suspension of capital punishment in Iraq.' After "recog-
nising that the former regime used certain provisions of the penal code as a tool of
repression in violation of internationally recognized human rights standards," the
order declared bluntly: "Capital punishment is suspended."' There is, to be sure, no
shortage of evidence for the abusive use of capital punishment in Iraq under Saddam
Hussein's regime.' But then, there is also no shortage of similar abuse within the
United States. In fact, for many years, Iraq and the United States have been among
the world's leaders in the field, reflecting some common values, a discussion of
which is beyond the scope of this paper. The principal reason for the Bremer decree
suspending the death penalty was concern in London that the United Kingdom
would be accountable before the European Court of Human Rights for the practice
of the death penalty in occupied Iraq, consistent with the settled jurisprudence of the
Court.' It is no coincidence that a few days after the decree, the United Kingdom
deposited its instrument of ratification of Protocol No. 13 to the European
Convention on Human Rights, which abolished the death penalty in wartime as well
as in peacetime.5 If President Bush persists in his calls for the execution of Saddam
Hussein, he is headed for a collision with his principal military and political ally.
* Professor of Human Rights Law, National University of Ireland, Galway and Director,
Irish Centre for Human Rights; Commissioner, Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation
Commission.
This Article is adapted from my introduction to: HANS GORAN FRANCK,THE BARBARIC
PUNISHMENT: ABOLISHING THE DEATH PENALTY 1-24 (William A. Schabas ed., 2003).
' Coalition Provisional Order No. 7 (CPA/ORD/9 June 2003/07) § 3(1) (2003), available
at http://www.cpa-iraq.org. On April 22, 2004, Iraq co-sponsored a resolution in the UN
Commission on Human Rights calling for a moratorium on the death penalty.
2 Id.
' See, e.g., Capital Punishment and Implementation of the Safeguards Guaranteeing
Protection of the Rights of Those Facing the Death Penalty: Report of the Secretary-General,
U.N. ESCOR Comm'n on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice, 9th Sess. at paras. 86, 88,
103, 106, U.N. Doc. E/2000/3 (2000).
' Loizidou v. Turkey (Preliminary Objections), 310 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1995),
reprinted in 16 HUMAN RTS. L.J. 15.
' Protocol No. 13 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, May 3, 2002, Europ. T.S. No. 183 [hereinafter Protocol No. 13].
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It is a direct and quite visible consequence of the increasing scope of the international
human rights law norm that prohibits the death penalty.
It is often said that international law does not prohibit the death penalty.6 This
is an unfortunate and imprecise statement, however, because several international
treaties, the most recent of them Protocol No. 13, now outlaw the death penalty.
These treaties are, to be sure, still somewhat far from universally accepted. Never-
theless, approximately seventy states are now bound, as a question of international
law and as a result of ratified treaties,7 not to impose the death penalty.' In a recent
decision, the European Court of Human Rights ruled that the practice of the Council
of Europe's member states now means the death penalty is prohibited by the
European Convention on Human Rights, despite the explicit recognition of capital
punishment in Article 2(1) of the Convention.9 In other words, at this stage in the
6 See, e.g., Extrajudicial, Summary, or Arbitrary Executions: Report of the Special
Rapporteur, U.N. ESCOR Comm'n on Human Rights, 56th Sess., Provisional Agenda Item
1 l(b), at para. 60, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2000/3 (2000) ("[C]apital punishment has not yet been
prohibited under international law.").
' Protocol No. 6 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms Concerning the Abolition of the Death Penalty, Europ. T.S. No. 114 [hereinafter
Protocol No. 6]; G.A. Res. 44/128, U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 206, U.N. Doc.
A/Res/44/128 (1989) [hereinafter International Covenant]; Additional Protocol to the
American Convention on Human Rights to Abolish the Death Penalty, June 8, 1990,
O.A.S.T.S. No. 73, 29 I.L.M. 1447 [hereinafter American Convention]; Protocol No. 13,
supra note 5. The American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S.
123, art. 4, prohibits the death penalty in states that have previously abolished it. According
to some members of the Human Rights Committee, the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, is also an abolitionist instrument for states
that have already abolished the death penalty: Ng v. Canada (No. 469/1991), U.N. Doc.
A/49/40, Vol. II, at 189, reprinted in 15 HuM. RTS. L.J. 149 (1994) (Aguilar Urbina, J.,
dissenting; Pocar, J., partially dissenting). The decision probably now reflects the views of
the majority of the Committee, in light of Judge v. Canada (No. 829/1998), U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/78/D/829/1998 (2003).
8 See, e.g., ROGER HOOD, THE DEATH PENALTY: A WORLDWIDE PERSPECTIVE (3d ed.
2002) (listing countries that have signed or ratified Protocol No. 6 and the Additional
Protocol to the American Convention). Albania, Andorra, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan,
Belgium, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Chile, Cyprus, Colombia, Costa
Rica, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador,
Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland,
Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxemburg, Macedonia, Malta, Mexico,
Moldova, Monaco, Mozambique, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, Nicaragua, New Zealand,
Norway, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Romania, San Marino, Seychelles,
Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Suriname, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, United
Kingdom, Uruguay and Venezuela. Id. These states are abolitionist both de jure and de facto.
Id. The Russian Federation and Sao Tome and Principe have signed one or another of the
protocols but instruments of ratification have not yet been deposited. Id.
9 Ocalan v. Turkey, App. No. 46221/99, 2003 Eur Ct. H.R. 125, at paras. 188-99. The
judgment is currently being reconsidered by a Grand Chamber of the Court.
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development of European law, Protocol No. 13 is largely symbolic and does no
more than codify existing state practice and contemporary legal interpretation of the
Convention itself. As for the suggestion that customary law prohibits capital pun-
ishment, such an affirmation is perhaps premature, although the growing trend
towards abolition, and its reflection in international norms, would suggest that this
is a probable development at some point in the not-too-distant future.
Few more dramatic examples of the spread and success of human rights law can
be found. This constant progress towards abolition provides us with benchmarks for
the more general triumph of what might be called the "human rights ideal,"
proclaimed in Franklin D. Roosevelt's "Four Freedoms"' speech,'" in the Atlantic
Charter," and in the preamble to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
(Universal Declaration):
Whereas disregard and contempt for human rights have
resulted in barbarous acts which have outraged the conscience
of mankind, and the advent of a world in which human beings
shall enjoy freedom of speech and belief and freedom from fear
and want has been proclaimed as the highest aspiration of the
common people .... 12
This human rights ideal guided the establishment of the UN, and has animated
regional organisations like the Council of Europe, the Organisation of American
States, the African Union, the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe
and, increasingly, the European Union. Limitation and abolition of capital punish-
ment has become a central theme in the standard-setting and monitoring by these
key international organisations.
While we can trace abolitionist efforts back to Cesare Beccaria and the
Enlightenment, and perhaps even before, the modem movement to abolish the death
penalty really began in the late 1940s. Within Europe, several of the former
dictatorships, including Germany, Austria, and Italy, abolished capital punishment
as part of the "transitional justice" process by which they turned the page on the
abuses of the previous decades. At the same time, human rights law emerged as the
guiding normative regime for the newly-minted international organisations, the UN
and the Council of Europe. Discussing the "right to life" provision of the Universal
Declaration in 1948, the UN General Assembly contemplated calling for abolition,
but then retreated cautiously, essentially because a majority of the world's states
10 Franklin D. Roosevelt, Address of the President of the United States Before a Joint
Session of Congress (Jan. 6, 1941), in 87 CONG. REC. 44-47 (1941), available at http://our-
documents.gov/doc.php?flash=true&doc=70 (last visited Oct. 25, 2004).
" Atlantic Charter, Aug. 14,1941, U.S.-U.K., available at http://www.yale.edullawweb/
avalonwwii/atlantic.htm (last visited Oct. 25, 2004).
12 G.A. Res. 217, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess. at 71, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948).
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were not yet ready. In a sense, their minds were ahead of their practice. Indeed,
hardly a voice was raised during the debate in the General Assembly to claim that
capital punishment was legitimate, appropriate, orjustified.13 The death penalty was
treated as an inevitable and necessary exception to the right to life, but also one
whose validity was increasingly open to challenge. This was indeed the expectation
of the drafters.
Full-fledged and complete respect for the right to life, something which
necessarily involves the abolition of the death penalty, stands as the implied
"common standard of achievement" in article 3 of the Universal Declaration. Half
a century later, that "achievement" has made great strides, although it remains very
much a work in progress in some parts of the world. But Europe has become,
essentially, a death-penalty-free zone. In December 2000, the European Union
adopted its Charter of Fundamental Rights, article 2 of which declares:
1. Everyone has the right to life.
2. No one shall be condemned to the death penalty, or
executed. 4
The Universal Declaration of December 10, 1948, provided the initial
framework for the development of what is now a sophisticated and complex system
of international human rights law. It has been argued occasionally that the death
penalty is not even a human rights issue. 5 Countries hostile to the progressive
development of international law on the subject the death penalty take the position
that the death penalty is sheltered by a provision within the Charter of the UN
deeming such matters to be "essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any
state."' 6 The debate during adoption of article 3 of the Universal Declaration by the
UN General Assembly shows that such an argument is unfounded. What the
Declaration specifically has to say about capital punishment is something that has
evolved since 1948 and will continue to evolve with the development of the law
itself, in much the same way as the interpretation of the broad and general
provisions in national constitutions adjust to changing times.
'3 See WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, THE ABOLITION OF THE DEATH PENALTY IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 27-39 (3d ed. 2002) (recounting discussions on capital punishment in
the drafting of the Universal Declaration).
" Charter for Fundamental Rights of the European Union, art. 2 (2000).
j5 For a recent example, see the remarks of the Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago,
Lawrence Maharaj, who explains the death penalty as an issue of "national security and
maintenance of public order" but not a human rights issue. Press Release, UN Human Rights
Committee, Experts Regret Maintenance of Capital and Corporal Punishments (Oct. 17,
2000), http://www.unhchr.ch/huricane/huricane.nsf/0/33F938EECA3ABBD7CI25697C-
002D2BBE?opendocument (last visited Jan. 12, 2005).
16 U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 7.
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Slightly more than a decade ago, in 1989, Amnesty International published a
seminal volume on the issue of capital punishment, entitled When the State Kills.' 7
Amnesty International surveyed the international situation, distinguishing between
countries that were abolitionist for all crimes (countries whose laws do not provide
for the death penalty for any crime), countries that were abolitionist for ordinary
crimes only (countries whose laws provide for the death penalty only for exceptional
crimes under military law or crimes committed in exceptional circumstances such
as wartime), countries that were abolitionist in practice (countries and territories that
retain the death penalty for ordinary crimes but did not execute anyone during the
preceding ten years or more), and retentionist countries (countries and territories that
retain and use the death penalty for ordinary crimes). 8 The statistical portrait was
as follows:
Abolitionist for all crimes: 35 countries
Abolitionist for ordinary crimes only: 18 countries
Abolitionist in practice: 27 countries
Retentionist: 100 countries
Amnesty International also provided the relevant dates of abolition, where
applicable. The dates indicated an unmistakable trend towards abolition, one that
was constantly growing in momentum. For example, of the thirty-five countries that
were abolitionist for all crimes, twenty-seven had abolished the death penalty since
1948. Moreover, with each decade subsequent to 1948, the number of states abol-
ishing capital punishment increased. However, the figures also indicated that a
majority of states continued to employ capital punishment.
In the mid-i 990s, the majority shifted from one favoring capital punishment to
one opposing it. According to the report of the Secretary-General of the UN, issued
on March 31, 2000,"9 the result of research directed by Professor Roger Hood, the
numbers stood as follows:
Abolitionist for all crimes: 74 countries
Abolitionist for ordinary crimes only: 11 countries
Abolitionist in practice: 38 countries
Retentionist: 71 countries"
17 AMNESTY INT'L, WHEN THE STATE KILLS: THE DEATH PENALTY: A HUMAN RIGHTs
ISSUE (1989).
' Id. at 259-62.
1 Capital Punishment and Implementation of the Safeguards Guaranteeing Protection
of the Rights of Those Facing the Death Penalty: Report of the Secretary-General, supra
note 3.
20 HOOD, supra note 8.
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The change throughout the 1990s, since the Amnesty International study, was most
dramatic. Whereas in 1989, some forty-four percent of states were abolitionist in
one form or another, by the year 2000, abolitionist states made up sixty-four percent
of the total.
Those states that still retain the death penalty find themselves increasingly
subject to international pressure in favor of abolition, for example, in the refusal by
certain countries to grant extradition where a fugitive will be exposed to a capital
sentence. In fact, most developed countries now refuse to extradite fugitives to the
United States without assurances that capital punishment will not be imposed.
Abolition of the death penalty is generally considered to be an important element in
democratic development for states breaking with a past characterized by terror,
injustice, and repression. In some cases, abolition is effected by explicit reference
in constitutional instruments to the international treaties prohibiting the death
penalty. In other cases, it has been the contribution of the judiciary, judges applying
constitutions that make no specific mention of the death penalty but that enshrine
the right to life and prohibit cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment or punishment.
I. HUMAN RIGHTS TREATY LAW AND PRACTICE
One of the principal international human rights instruments, the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted in 1966, transformed the laconic
and in some sense equivocal "right to life" provision found in article 3 of the
Universal Declaration2 into a complex text that recognises capital punishment as an
exception or limitation on the right to life.22 Article 6 of the Covenant affirms the
"inherent right to life," adding that it cannot be "arbitrarily deprived." But in a
subsequent paragraph, the Covenant states:
In countries which have not abolished the death penalty,
sentence of death may be imposed only for the most serious
crimes in accordance with the law in force at the time of the
commission of the crime and not contrary to the provisions of
the present Covenant and to the Convention on the Prevention
and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. This penalty can
only be carried out pursuant to a final judgment rendered by a
competent court.23
The provision goes on to state that anyone sentenced to death is entitled to seek
amnesty, pardon or commutation of sentence, and that the death penalty is prohibited
21 Supra note 12, at art. 3.
22 International Covenant, supra note 7, at art. 6.
23 Id. at art. 6(2).
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for persons under the age of eighteen at the time of commission of the crime24 and
for pregnant women. A final paragraph, really more programmatic than normative,
declares: "Nothing in this article shall be invoked to delay or to prevent the abolition
of capital punishment by any State Party to the present Covenant." The Covenant
is currently ratified by approximately 150 states, and its principles are approaching
near-universal acceptance.
The Convention on the Rights of the Child, adopted in 1989, states: "Neither
capital punishment nor life imprisonment without possibility of release shall be
imposed for offences committed by persons below eighteen years of age. '25 The
Convention on the Rights of the Child has been ratified essentially by the whole
world with the exception of the United States, which signed it without reservation
in 1995. Even signatories to international treaties are required "to refrain from acts
which would defeat the object and purpose of a treaty. "26 At the beginning of the
1990s, Amnesty International reported that several countries continued to execute
persons for crimes committed while under the age of eighteen. Since then, both
Pakistan and Yemen have abandoned the practice, explaining that this initiative is
consistent with their obligations under the Convention on the Rights of the Child.
It is now believed that only the United States and Iran continue to execute juvenile
offenders. The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights has held that the
prohibition of execution for individuals who commit their crime while under the age
of eighteen is a norm of customary international law.27
In parallel to the UN instruments, regional human rights systems have also
emerged in Europe, the Americas, Africa, and the Arab world. In each, there is a
general international treaty similar to the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights. All four instruments recognise the right to life. Three instruments
resemble the Covenant because they treat the death penalty as a limitation or
exception to the right to life, while the fourth is simply silent on the subject. The
first of the regional treaties to be adopted, the European Convention on Human
Rights, actually predates the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights by
several years. It was drafted in 1950 by a handful of Western European states,
members of the Council of Europe at the time, although its reach has now extended
to forty-one parties with the dramatic expansion of the organisation in the 1990s.
Like the International Covenant, the European Convention allows capital punishment
as an exception to the right to life.28 The "right to life" provision in the American
24 Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3, 44
(prohibiting executions for crimes committed under the age of eighteen). The Convention has
been ratified by 192 countries, and signed but not ratified by the United States.
25 Id. at 55.
26 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 18, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 336.
27 Case 12.285, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 913, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.1 17, doc. 5 rev. 1 (2002).
28 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4,
1950, art. 2, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, 224.
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Convention on Human Rights, adopted in 1969, rather closely resembles the text of
article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, but with two
significant changes that limit the scope of capital punishment.29 In addition to
pregnant women and juveniles, capital punishment is also a prohibited sentence for
persons over seventy years of age. Furthermore, the Convention explicitly specifies
that "[t]he death penalty shall not be reestablished in states that have abolished it,"
something that is only implicit in the Covenant.3 The African Charter of Human
and Peoples' Rights, recognises the right to life but never explicitly mentions capital
punishment. Most commentators conclude that capital punishment must be an
implied limitation upon the right to life, given the still-widespread use of the death
penalty within Africa.3' However, under a dynamic interpretation informed by
jurisprudential developments like the judgment of the South African Constitutional
Court abolishing the death penalty, 32 it is now argued that the African Charter also
mandates abolition. 3 The Arab Charter of Human Rights, adopted in 1994 by the
League of Arab States, but not yet in force, allows the death penalty in cases of
"serious crimes," but prohibits its use for political crimes, crimes committed while
under the age of eighteen, and for both pregnant women and nursing mothers, for
a period of up to two years following childbirth3 4
Analysis of the capital punishment provisions in the International Covenant and
the European and American conventions shows a definite trend towards limitation
on the use of capital punishment. The instrument that is most tolerant of the death
penalty, the European Convention, was adopted in 1950. The most recent regional
conference, the American Convention, seems to flirt with outright abolition. By the
time it was adopted in 1969, the idea that these instruments should be amended to
take into account abolitionist trends was already making the rounds. At the 1969
San Jose Conference, which adopted the American Convention, the U.S. delegate
29 Compare International Covenant, supra note 7, with American Convention, supra
note 7.
30 American Convention, supra note 7, at art. 4.
3' African Charter of Human and Peoples' Rights, O.A.U. Doc. CABILEG/67/3/Rev. 5.
It would be wrong to exaggerate the scope of capital punishment within Africa, however.
Leaving aside the Arab states north of the Sahara, nearly half of African states have stopped
using the death penalty and many have abolished it dejure. On capital punishment in Africa,
see generally William A. Schabas, Abolition of the Death Penalty in Africa, in THE
INTERNATIONAL SOURCEBOOK ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 30-65 (William A. Schabas, ed.,
1997).
32 State v. Makwanyane, 1995 (3) SARL 391 (CC) (S. Afr.), reprinted in 16 HuM. RTS.
L.J. 154 (1995).
" Manfred Nowak, Is the Death Penalty an Inhuman Punishment?, in THE
JURISPRUDENCE OF HuMAN RIGHTS LAW: A COMPARATIVE ITTERPRETIVE APPROACH 42-43
(Theodore S. Orlin et al. eds., 2000).
3 Arab Charter on Human Rights, Sept. 15, 1994, arts. 10-12,4 I.H.R.R. 850, reprinted
in 18 HuM. RTS. L.J. 151 (1997).
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spoke of "the general trend, already apparent, for the gradual abolition of the death
penalty. ' 35  Fourteen of the nineteen states present at the negotiation of the
Convention adopted a statement calling for preparation of a protocol abolishing the
death penalty.36
European norms regarding the right to life are the most conservative, although
practice on the continent has begun to change. The Council of Europe took the lead
in 1983 by adopting a protocol to the European Convention abolishing capital
punishment in peacetime.37 Similar instruments for the other two systems, the
Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant and the Protocol to the
American Convention on Human Rights to Abolish the Death Penalty, were adopted
at the end of the 1980s and came into force shortly afterward. 3' Finally, in 2002, the
result of efforts by abolitionists like Hans Gtran Franck,39 a second protocol to the
European Convention dealing with capital punishment, Protocol No. 13 to the
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
concerning the abolition of the death penalty in all circumstances, was adopted.'
All four instruments are "optional," and do not amend the original texts as such;
rather, they offer state parties to the original texts the possibility of enhancing their
obligations. But their success is impressive, and more than fifty ratifications have
already been deposited. The number continues to grow rapidly.
Setting aside the protocols, whose effects seem clear enough, international law
may also prohibit capital punishment by implication, through the effect of other
norms that do not explicitly call for abolition, and more specifically by the
prohibition of cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment or punishment, a norm found
in all major human rights treaties and in most domestic constitutions. The concept
31 OAS Doc. OEAISer.K/XVI/l.1, doc. 10, at 9.
36 The undersigned Delegations, participants in the Specialised Inter-
American Conference on Human Rights, in response to the majority
sentiment expressed in the course of the debates on the prohibition of
the death penalty, in agreement with the most pure humanistic
traditions of our peoples, solemnly declare our firm hope of seeing the
application of the death penalty eradicated from the American
environment as of the present and our unwavering goal of making all
possible efforts so that, in a short time, an additional protocol to the
American Convention on Human Rights - Pact of San Jos6, Costa
Rica - may consecrate the final abolition of the death penalty and
place America once again in the vanguard of the defense of the
fundamental rights of man.
OAS Doc. OEA/Ser.K/XVI/1.2, at 467.
3 Protocol No. 6, supra note 7.
38 International Covenant, supra note 7; American Convention, supra note 7.
39 HANS GORAN FRANCK, THE BARBARIC PUNISHMENT: ABOLISHING THE DEATH
PENALTY (William A. Schabas ed., 2003).
41 Protocol No. 13, supra note 5.
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of what is cruel, inhuman, or degrading ought to change over time to reflect
contemporary thinking and values. There is no doctrine of original intent - the
bugbear of so much constitutional interpretation within the United States - with
respect to international human rights treaties. In fact, quite the opposite exists. It
is now well-accepted that international human rights norms must receive a dynamic
and "evolutive" construction.
Many human rights treaties, like many national constitutions, acknowledge the
death penalty as an exception to the right to life, but prohibit cruel, inhuman, and
degrading treatment or punishment. For example, the Fifth Amendment to the
United States Constitution grants the right to due process for a person charged with
"a capital or otherwise infamous crime," yet the Eighth Amendment prohibits "cruel
and unusual punishment." Does the reference to capital punishment in constitutions
and treaties effectively foreclose any consideration of the death penalty as an
intrinsically cruel, inhuman, or degrading punishment? Or is it conceivable that
present or future interpreters will consider the capital punishment exception to the
right to life to be neutralised or trumped by new conceptions of what is cruel,
inhuman, or degrading? In constitutions where there is no exception to the right to
life, some courts have concluded that capital punishment is prohibited by the cruel,
inhuman, or degrading clause. But the argument by which it is implicitly repealed,
despite some more explicit recognition, was rejected by the European Court of
Human Rights (with a lone dissenter),4 much as it had been dismissed nearly two
decades earlier by the majority of the United States Supreme Court in the Eighth
Amendment case of Furman v. Georgia.42
Still, the argument that capital punishment is contrary to the prohibition of cruel,
inhuman, and degrading (or "cruel and unusual") punishment is a judicial time
bomb, ticking away inexorably as international abolition gains momentum. In 2001,
the Supreme Court of Canada, clearly impressed with developments in international
human rights law and state practice, reassessed its position on capital punishment,
denying extradition to the United States for a capital offence as a violation of the
constitution when a decade earlier it had balked at such a conclusion.43
The argument has also returned to the European Court in an application filed by
convicted Kurdish terrorist Abdullah Ocalan. Condemned to death by a Turkish
court in early 1999, Ocalan's request for provisional measures was granted by the
European Court of Human Rights in November of 1999.44 In its judgment of March
4' Soering v. United Kingdom, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at para. 8 (1989).
42 See, e.g., Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 360-69 (1972).
13 United States v. Bums, [2001] S.C.R. 183 (reversing Kindler v. Canada, [1991] S.C.R.
779).
44 Ocalan v. Turkey, App. No. 46221/99, 2003 Eur Ct. H.R. 125, at para. 5 (The Court
granted the request for provisional measures on Nov. 30, 1999, directing the State "to take
all necessary steps to ensure that the death penalty is not carried out so as to enable the Court
to proceed effectively with the examination of the admissibility and merits of the applicant's
complaints under the Convention.").
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12, 2003, the European Court quoted the opinion adopted by the Parliamentary
Assembly of the Council of Europe in conjunction with Protocol No. 13:
The second sentence of Article 2 of the European Convention
on Human Rights still provides for the death penalty. It has long
been in the interest of the Assembly to delete this sentence, thus
matching theory with reality. This interest is strengthened by
the fact that more modem national constitutional documents and
international treaties no longer include such provisions.45
The European Court revised the position it took in Soering, holding that the practice
of member states of the Council of Europe has had the effect of implied repeal of
article 2(1) of the European Convention, to the extent that it authorises the death
penalty. Necessarily, then, capital punishment is a form of "inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment" incompatible with article 3 of the Convention.
Equally the Court observes that the legal position as regards
the death penalty has undergone a considerable evolution since
the Soering case was decided. The de facto abolition noted in
that case in respect of twenty-two Contracting States in 1989 has
developed into a dejure abolition in forty-three of the forty-four
Contracting States - most recently in the respondent State -
and a moratorium in the remaining State which has not yet
abolished the penalty, namely Russia. This almost complete
abandonment of the death penalty in times of peace in Europe is
reflected in the fact that all the Contracting States have signed
Protocol No. 6 and forty-one States have ratified it, that is to say,
all except Turkey, Armenia and Russia. It is further reflected in
the policy of the Council of Europe which requires that new
member States undertake to abolish capital punishment as a
condition of their admission into the organisation. As a result of
these developments the territories encompassed by the member
States of the Council of Europe have become a zone free of
capital punishment.
Such a marked development could now be taken as
signalling the agreement of the Contracting States to abrogate,
or at the very least to modify, the second sentence of Article 2
§ 1, particularly when regard is had to the fact that all
Contracting States have now signed Protocol No. 6 and that it
has been ratified by forty-one States. It may be questioned
41 Id. at para. 57.
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whether it is necessary to await ratification of Protocol No. 6 by
the three remaining States before concluding that the death
penalty exception in Article 2 has been significantly modified.
Against such a consistent background, it can be said that capital
punishment in peacetime has come to be regarded as an
unacceptable, if not inhuman, form of punishment which is no
longer permissible under Article 2.
In expressing this view, the Court is aware of the opening
for signature of Protocol No. 13 which provides an indication
that the Contracting States have chosen the traditional method of
amendment of the text of the Convention in pursuit of their
policy of abolition. However this Protocol seeks to extend the
prohibition by providing for the abolition of the death penalty in
all circumstances - that is to say both in time of peace and in
times of war. This final step toward complete abolition of the
death penalty can be seen as a confirmation of the abolitionist
trend established by the practice of the Contracting States. It
does not necessarily run counter to the view that Article 2 has
been amended in so far as it permits the death penalty in times
of peace.
In the Court's view, it cannot now be excluded, in the light
of the developments that have taken place in this area, that the
States have agreed through their practice to modify the second
sentence in Article 2 § 1 in so far as it permits capital punish-
ment in peacetime. Against this background it can also be
argued that the implementation of the death penalty can be
regarded as inhuman and degrading treatment contrary to Article
3. However it is not necessary for the Court to reach any firm
conclusion on this point since for the following reasons it would
run counter to the Convention, even if Article 2 were to be
construed as still permitting the death penalty, to implement a
death sentence following an unfair trial.'
The judgment is cautiously worded and seemingly equivocal. But in the final
analysis, the European Court clearly rules that the death penalty in peacetime is
contrary to article 3, and thus it is not sheltered by article 2(1), because that
provision has been implicitly amended by state practice.47 This is confirmed by
statements in the partially dissenting opinion of the Turkish judge.4"
' Id. at paras. 195-98.
47 id.
48 id. (Tiirmen, J., partially dissenting).
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There is now considerable case law on the interpretation of the human rights
treaty provisions dealing with capital punishment. The Human Rights Committee,
which is the organ established by the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights to study periodic reports from states and to consider petitions from aggrieved
individuals and states, has examined capital punishment issues regarding many of
the states that are parties to the Covenant. Accordingly, it has been held that the
exception allowing capital punishment in countries "which have not abolished the
death penalty" means that a country that has already eliminated capital punishment
cannot reinstate it.49 The restriction on capital punishment to "the most serious
crimes" has led to criticism of states that impose it for economic crimes and other
offences with non-lethal consequences.5 0 The prohibition on executions forjuvenile
offenders is a norm so fundamental that even a reservation formulated at the time
of ratification is ineffective.51 Methods of execution that inflict superfluous or
prolonged suffering on the condemned person, such as the gas chamber, constitute
cruel, inhuman, and degrading punishment, in breach of article 7 of the Covenant.52
An enormous number of cases before the Human Rights Committee has dealt with
capital punishment in Jamaica and elsewhere in the English-speaking Caribbean.
Most of these cases have involved procedural flaws at trial or appeal. The
Committee holds to the view that the strictest respect for procedural due process
guarantees must be ensured if the death penalty is to be imposed." Many death
penalty applications are also granted because conditions on death row have been
held to breach international standards.54 Practically, this has meant that in approxi-
mately eighty-five percent of capital punishment cases to be heard by the Committee
" Piandiong v. Philippines, Case 869/1999, U.N. Hum. Rts. Comm'n, U.N. Doc. CCPR
/C/70/D/869/1999, para. 7.4 (2000).
5 E.g., U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/SR.1065-67, U.N. Doc. A/46/40, para. 509; U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/SR.365, paras. 7-8; U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/SR.870-71, 874-75; U.N. Doc. A/44/40,
para. 259; U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/SR.928-32; U.N. Doc. A/45/40, para. 93; U.N. Doc. CCPR/
C/SR.119, § 14; U.N. Doc. CCPR/CI79/Add.50, para. 16 (1995).
"' When the United States ratified the Covenant in 1992, it formulated a controversial
reservation to article 6: "The United States reserves the right, subject to its Constitutional
constraints, to impose capital punishment on any person (other than a pregnant woman) duly
convicted under existing or future laws permitting the imposition of capital punishment,
including such punishment for crimes committed by persons below eighteen years of age."
The reservation was condemned in objections filed by eleven European states, including
Sweden, and declared invalid by the Human Rights Committee. Consideration of Reports
Submitted by States Parties Under Article 40 of the Covenant, Comments of the Human
Rights Committee, United States - Initial Report, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.50, para. 14.
52 Ng v. Canada, 149 HuM. RTs. L.J. at 157.
3 See, e.g., Yasseen & Thomas v. Guyana (No. 676/1996), U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/
62/D/676/1996; LaVende v. Trinidad and Tobago (No. 554/1993), U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/61/
D/554/1993.
" See, e.g., Henry v. Trinidad and Tobago (No. 752/1997), U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/64/
D1752/1997; Lewis v. Jamaica (No. 527/1993), U.N. Doc. CCPR/Cf57/D/527/1993.
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there is a finding of a violation of the Covenant. Some members of the Committee
have never dismissed a death penalty petition, and there is certainly a constituency
among Committee members for total abolition.
Trinidad and Tobago was so incensed by the Committee's findings in death
penalty applications that it withdrew from the Optional Protocol to the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the treaty that provides for a right of indi-
vidual petition. Immediately afterward, Trinidad and Tobago ratified the Protocol
for the second time, but on this occasion it appended a reservation excluding all
death penalty applications. In a subsequent application from Trinidad and Tobago
that raised a death penalty issue, the Committee held that the subterfuge of
denouncing the Protocol and then ratifying it with a reservation was invalid."
States that are parties to the International Covenant are required to submit
periodic reports on compliance with provisions of the Covenant. This provides the
Human Rights Committee with an opportunity to question states in public session
about death penalty issues and to recommend changes to legislation or practices to
ensure that there are no violations. The United States ratified the Covenant in 1992
and presented its initial report to the Human Rights Committee in March 1995. The
Committee made the following comment:
The Committee is concerned about the excessive number of
offences punishable by the death penalty in a number of States,
the number of death sentences handed down by court, and the
long stay on death row which, in specific instances, may amount
to a breach of article 7 of the Covenant. It deplores the recent
expansion of the death penalty under federal law and the re-
establishment of the death penalty in certain States. It also
deplores provisions in the legislation of a number of States
which allow the death penalty to be pronounced for crimes
committed by persons under eighteen and the actual instances
where such sentences have been pronounced and executed. It
also regrets that, in some cases, there appears to have been lack
of protection from the death penalty of those mentally retarded.1
6
The Committee recommended the following:
The Committee urges the State party to revise the federal and
State legislation with a view to restricting the number of
offences carrying the death penalty strictly to the most serious
crimes, in conformity with article 6 of the Covenant and with a
5 Kennedy v. Trinidad and Tobago (No. 845/1999), U.N. Doc. CCPRC/67/D/845/1999.
56 U.N. Doc. CCPR/CF/9/Add.47, para. 16.
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view eventually to abolishing it. It exhorts the authorities to
take appropriate steps to ensure that persons are not sentenced
to death for crimes committed before they were eighteen. 7
In June 2002, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights ruled that criminal
laws providing for capital punishment as a mandatory sentence for specific crimes
were contrary to the American Convention on Human Rights.
The Court finds that the Offences Against the Person Act of
1925 of Trinidad and Tobago automatically and generically
mandates the application of the death penalty for murder and
disregards the fact that murder may have varying degrees of
seriousness. Consequently, this Act prevents the judge from
considering the basic circumstances in establishing the degree of
culpability and individualising the sentence since it compels the
indiscriminate imposition of the same punishment for conduct
that can be vastly different. In light of Article 4 of the American
Convention, this is exceptionally grave, as it puts at risk the
most cherished possession, namely, human life, and is arbitrary
according to the terms of Article 4(1) of the Convention.5"
Imposition of the death penalty has been challenged somewhat indirectly in
cases where foreign nationals are threatened with execution. Under article 36(1)(b)
of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, 9 foreign nationals have a right to
be informed of their right to consular assistance in the event of arrest. It has become
clear that many if not most foreign nationals condemned to death within the United
States have not been given this information, which is essentially a due process
guarantee akin to the "Miranda warning" given by police officers as a result of a
constitutional requirement that suspects be informed of their right to counsel. Three
cases brought against the United States by Paraguay, Germany, and Mexico have
been taken before the International Court of Justice. Provisional measures requests
to suspend, at least temporarily, the planned executions were issued by the Court,
but these were defied by authorities in the United States.60 Paraguay eventually
5 Id. at para. 31.
5 Case 11.816, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 237, OEA/Ser.LUV/Il.102, doc. 6 rev., at para 103
(1998).
5 596 U.N.T.S. 261 (1963).
6 Case Concerning the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (Para. v. U.S.),
Provisional Measures, Order of Apr. 9, 1998; LaGrand Case (F.R.G. v. U.S.), Provisional
Measures, Order of Mar. 3, 1999, [1999) ICJ Reports 1; Case of Avena and Other Mexican
Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), Provisional Measures, Order of Feb. 5, 2003.
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dropped its application. But Germany proceeded, and in June 2001 the United
States was found liable for a breach of international law for the execution of the
LaGrand brothers, and for failure to honour a request from the International Court
of Justice to stay the proceedings until judgment was rendered. 6' The Mexican case
was argued on the merits in December 2003, and at the time of this writing a
decision has not been reached.62
Similar issues were also debated before the Inter-American Court of Human
Rights in the context of a request for an advisory opinion filed by Mexico. The
Inter-American Court concluded that in a death penalty case, violation of the right
to be informed of consular assistance was not only in breach of the Vienna
Convention, but also of the due process provisions of major human rights treaties
as well as the right not be deprived of life "arbitrarily," which is protected by article
4 of the American Convention on Human Rights and article 6 of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.63
H. INTERNATIONAL POLrrICAL INITIATIVES
Parallel with the drafting of international legal norms found in the Universal
Declaration and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the
political bodies of the UN and of other international organisations have been
involved in a variety of initiatives aimed at limiting and eventually abolishing the
death penalty. Although the death penalty issue has been addressed within those
specialised bodies of the UN that concern criminal law,(, the core of the debate has
taken place in the Commission on Human Rights. The Commission is a specialised
body, comprised of fifty-three states elected by the Economic and Social Council.
Its membership broadly reflects the geographic and political orientations of the
entire UN membership. Although its interventions may be less robust than those of
tribunals and similar bodies, like the Human Rights Committee, it has the advantage
61 LaGrand Case (F.R.G. v. U.S.), June 27, 2001.
62 Press Release, International Court of Justice (Dec. 23, 2003).
63 The Right to Information on Consular Assistance in the Context of the Guarantees of
Due Process of Law, Advisory Opinion OC-16/99 of Oct. 1, 1999, available at http://
www.icj-cij.org.
' Notably, the UN Committee and Commission on Crime Prevention and Control has
been considering the subject of capital punishment since the 1950s. See ROGER S. CLARK,
THE UNITED NATIONS CRIME PREVENTION AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROGRAM, FORMULATION
OF STANDARDS AND EFFORTS ATTHEIR IMPLEMENTATION 58-62 (1994); Roger S. Clark, The
Eighth UN Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, Havana,
Cuba, August 27-September 7, 1990, 1 CRIM. L.F. 513 (1990); Roger S. Clark, Human
Rights and the U.N. Committee on Crime Prevention and Control, 506 ANNALS AM. ASSOC.
POL. & Soc. SCI. 68 (1989).
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of being able to address violations of fundamental rights in all UN member states,
even those that have not fully ratified the relevant treaties.
Much of the monitoring and fact finding work of the Commission on Human
Rights is carried out by special rapporteurs. The special rapporteur on extrajudicial,
summary, or arbitrary executions from 1992 to 1999, Bacre Waly Ndiaye, took the
view that international human rights law seeks the abolition of the death penalty.
He has stated that "given that the loss of life is irreparable ... the abolition of capital
punishment is most desirable in order fully to respect the right to life." According
to Ndiaye, "where there is a fundamental right to life, there is no right to capital
punishment." In 1996 alone, he sent urgent appeals to the United States concerning
death sentences imposed on the mentally retarded, in cases following trial in which
the right to an adequate defence had allegedly not been fully ensured, where
individuals had been sentenced to death without resorting to their right to a legal or
clemency appeal, and where they had been sentenced to death despite strong
indications casting doubt on their guilt. Ndiaye sent a special appeal to the United
States in the case of Joseph Roger O'Dell who, according to his report to the
Commission on Human Rights, "has reportedly extraordinary proof of innocence
which could not be considered because the law of the State of Virginia does not
allow new evidence into court 21 days after conviction." Despite an international
campaign, O'Dell was executed in July 1997. The special rapporteur also noted that
in response to his urgent appeals, the U.S. government provided nothing more than
a reply in the form of a description of the legal safeguards provided to defendants
in the United States in criminal cases.65
In his 1997 report to the Commission on Human Rights, special rapporteur
Ndiaye noted:
As in previous years, the Special Rapporteur received numer-
ous reports indicating that in some cases the practice of capital
punishment in the United States does not conform to a number
of safeguards and guarantees contained in international instru-
ments relating to the rights of those facing the death penalty.
The imposition of the death penalty on mentally retarded
persons, the lack of adequate defence, the absence of obligatory
appeals and racial bias continue to be the main concerns.'
65 See Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions: Report of the Special
Rapporteur, at paras. 544-46, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1997/60 (1997); see also Extrajudicial,
Summary or Arbitrary Executions: Report of the Special Rapporteur, at paras. 507-17,
540-57, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1996/614 (1996).
66 Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions: Report of the Special Rapporteur,
at para. 543, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1997/60 (1997).
2004]
WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL
Ndiaye also stated that he,
remains deeply concerned that death sentences continue to be
handed down after trials which allegedly fall short of the inter-
national guarantees for a fair trial, including lack of adequate
defence during the trials and appeals procedures. An issue of
special concern to the Special Rapporteur remains the imposition
and application of the death penalty on persons reported to be
mentally retarded or mentally ill. Moreover, the Special
Rapporteur continues to be concerned about those cases which
were allegedly tainted by racial bias on the part of the judges or
prosecution and about the non-mandatory nature of the appeals
procedure after conviction in capital cases in some states. 67
As a result of repeated initiatives, the U.S. government extended a formal invitation
to Ndiaye to visit the country and conduct an investigation.' In October 1997, he
undertook a two-week mission to the United States, and attempted to visit death row
prisoners in Florida, Texas, and California. At California's San Quentin Penitentiary,
he was refused permission by authorities to meet with designated prisoners.
Ndiaye's visit provoked the ire of Senator Jesse Helms, the conservative chair of the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee, who in a letter to William Richardson, U.S.
Permanent Representative to the UN, described the mission as "an absurd UN
charade." Helms asked, "Bill, is this man confusing the United States with some
other country or is this an intentional insult to the United States and to our nation's
legal system?" Ndiaye replied, "I am very surprised that a country that is usually
so open and has been helpful to me on other missions, such as my attempts to
investigate human rights abuses in the Congo, should consider my visit an insult."'69
Ndiaye's successor as special rapporteur, Pakistani lawyer Asma Jahangir, has
continued to pursue capital punishment issues. In her 1999 report, she stated:
The Special Rapporteur's concerns as they relate to the
United States are limited to issues pertaining to the death
penalty. The increasing use of the death penalty is a matter of
serious concern and particularly worrisome are the continued
executions of mentally-ill and mentally-handicapped persons as
well as foreigners who were denied their international right to
67 Id. atpara. 551.
I d. at para. 549.
69 John M. Goshko, Helms Calls Death Row Probe "Absurd U.N. Charade": Senate
Foreign Affairs Chief Demands Explanations of Rights Investigation from U.S. Envoy,
WASH. POST, Oct. 8, 1997, at A7.
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consular assistance. The Special Rapporteur views the persistent
application of the death penalty and subsequent executions of
persons who committed crimes as minors as a very serious and
disturbing practice that inherently conflicts with the prevailing
international consensus.7 0
In 1997, the Commission on Human Rights began adopting a series of annual
resolutions on the subject of capital punishment. The resolution affirmed the
Commission's conviction "that abolition of the death penalty contributes to the
enhancement of human dignity and to the progressive development of human
rights."" It requested states to consider suspending executions and imposing a
moratorium on the death penalty. The resolution was passed by a roll call vote,
twenty-seven in favour and eleven opposed, with fourteen abstaining from the
vote. 2 Similar resolutions, with progressively sharper language, were adopted by
the Commission on Human Rights in subsequent years. The resolution adopted at
the Commission's 2000 session called upon states that retained the death penalty to
restrict progressively the number of offences for which it may be imposed, to
establish a moratorium on executions with a view to completely abolishing the death
penalty, and to make available to the public information with regard to capital
punishment. All states were required to reserve the right to refuse extradition in the
absence of assurances that the death penalty would not be imposed.73 With the
changing composition of the Commission, there were great concerns in 2003 that
the annual resolution would not pass. Nevertheless, the resolution was once again
adopted, by twenty-three votes to eighteen."'
The Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, an
expert body subordinate to the Commission on Human Rights, debated death
penalty issues at its 1999 session. In August 1999, it adopted a resolution condemn-
ing the imposition of the death penalty for crimes committed by persons under the
age of eighteen. A preamble to the resolution referred to six countries that had
applied capital punishment in such circumstances over the past decade: Iran,
70 Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions: Report of the Special Rapporteur,
U.N. ESCOR, 55th Sess., at para. 257, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1999/39/Add.1 (1999).
"' Question of the Death Penalty, C.H.R. Res. 1998/8, U.N. ESCOR Supp. No. 3, at 56,
U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1998/8 (1998).
72 Question of the Death Penalty, C.H.R. Res. 1997112, U.N. ESCOR, 37th mtg., Supp.
No. 3, at 69, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1997/12 (1997).
" Question of the Death Penalty, C.H.R. Res. 2000/65, 66th mtg., U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/RES/2000/65 (2000).
14 Question of the Death Penalty, C.H.R. Res. 2003/67, 61st mtg., U.N. Doc.
EICN.4/RES/2003/67 (2003).
See The Death Penalty, particularly in relation to Juvenile Offenders, U.N. Sub-
Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, 51st Sess., Res. 1999/4,
U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/RES/1999/4.
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Nigeria, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, the United States, and Yemen."6 The resolution
also called upon states not to apply the death penalty for refusal to serve in or
desertion from the military, and to commute all death sentences to at least life
imprisonment by December 31, 1999, to mark the millennium.77
Use of the death penalty throughout the world, including the United States, has
also been regularly denounced by the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Mary
Robinson. On February 4, 1998, Mrs. Robinson stated that she was "saddened to
learn of the death by lethal injection last night of Karla Faye Tucker who was put
to death for murders she committed fifteen years ago." Mrs Robinson also said
that the "increasing use of the death penalty in the United States and in a number of
other states is a matter of serious concern and runs counter to the international
community's expressed desire for the abolition of the death penalty."78
The death penalty has also been debated within the UN General Assembly.
Initially encouraged by the Commission on Human Rights that had been proposed
by Sweden and Austria, the General Assembly took up the issue of capital
punishment for the first time in 1968, with a resolution observing that "there is a
strong trend in most countries towards the abolition of capital punishment."7 9 The
resolution cited a series of safeguards respecting appeal, pardon and reprieve, and
mandated delay of execution until the exhaustion of such procedures, inviting
governments to provide a six-month moratorium before implementing the death
penalty.' Many member states favourable to capital punishment actually supported
the resolution, noting that it confined itself to the "humanitarian" aspect of the
question, 8 while some abolitionist states criticised the resolution's timidity, saying
it would not "induce Governments to abolish the death penalty."8 The resolution
declared that "the main objective to be pursued is that of progressively restricting
the number of offences for which capital punishment may be imposed with a view
to the desirability of abolishing this punishment in all countries.
76 id.
71 Id.; see also The Death Penalty in Relation to Juvenile Offenders, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/
Sub.2/RES/2000/17.
" Statement by Mary Robinson, UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, U.N. Doc.
HR/98/6 (1998).
" Capital Punishment, G.A. Res. 2393, U.N. GAOR, 23d Sess., U.N. Doc. A/Res./2393
(XXIII) (1968); see also Capital Punishment, U.N. GAOR, 23d Sess., 1727th plen. mtg. at
15, U.N. Doc. A/PV.1727 (1968) (adopting resolution by ninety-four votes to zero, with
three abstentions).
80 U.N. Doc. E/4475 (1968), U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/972 (1968), at 134-36, 162-64.
8' U.N. GAOR 3d Comm., 23d Sess., 1557th mtg., UN Doc. A/C.3/SR.1557, para. 17
(1968) (China); U.N. GAOR 3d Comm., 23d Sess., 1558th mtg., U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR. 1558,
para. 10 (1968) (France).
8 U.N. GAOR 3d Comm., 23d Sess., 1558th mtg., U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR.1558, para. 2
(1968) (Austria).
83 G.A. Res. 2857, U.N. GAOR, 26th Sess., 2027th plen. mtg., (XXVI) (1971).
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More than twenty years later, in 1994, capital punishment returned to the agenda
of the General Assembly in the form of a draft resolution inviting states which had
not yet abolished the death penalty to consider the progressive restriction of the
number of offences for which the death penalty might be imposed, and to exclude
the insane from capital punishment.' The final paragraph,
encourage[d] states which have not yet abolished the death
penalty to consider the opportunity of instituting a moratorium
on pending executions with a view to ensuring that the principle
that no state should dispose of the life of any human being be
affirmed in every part of the world by the year 2000.85
The proposer, Italy, eventually obtained forty-nine co-sponsors for the resolution.
However, a skillful procedural gambit engineered by Singapore succeeded in
blocking the resolution's adoption. 6
When the European Union again attempted a resolution in the General
Assembly in 1999, it was outmanoeuvred by some retentionist states, even though
these were very much in the minority. The whole business ended in a fiasco, and
the resolution was withdrawn before it could be put to a vote. Humiliated, the
European Union withdrew the resolution rather than see it transformed beyond
recognition. Speaking to the European Parliament, Commissioner Chris Patten said
it had been necessary "to freeze our resolution on the death penalty or risk the
passing of a resolution that would have incorporated wholly unacceptable arguments
that asserted that human rights are not universally applicable and valid.""7 He said
that "following intensive negotiation, we decided at last year's General Assembly
in November that no resolution was better than a fatally flawed text, and that
therefore the [European Union] should not pursue its initiative in [the UN General
Assembly]." Patten said that "hardline retentionists" now seem resigned to
resolutions in the Commission on Human Rights, but that "they will continue to
resist strongly any efforts to secure a General Assembly resolution.,
88
In 2003, there were initiatives within Italy, which held the presidency of the
European Union during the second half of the year, to attempt yet another resolution
in the General Assembly. Caution prevailed, however, and the proposal was
' See U.N. GAOR, 49th Sess., at 1-4, U.N. Doc. A/49/234 (1994), A/49/234/Add.1,
A/49/234/Add.2, revised by U.N. GAOR 3d Comm., 49th Sess., at 1-2, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/49/
L.32/Rev.1 (1994).
85 Id.
86 See id. at 2.; see generally Ilias Bantekas & Peter Hodgkinson, Capital Punishment at
the United Nations: Recent Developments, 11 CRIM. L.F. 23 (2000).
87 The Rt. Hon. Christopher Patten, Speech Before the European Parliament (Feb. 16,
2000).
8 The Rt. Hon. Christopher Patten, Speech Before the European Parliament, Plen. Sess.,
(Oct. 25, 2000).
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dropped before there could be a showdown with retentionist states. Just as the
Commission on Human Rights has proven itself to be fertile ground for death
penalty initiatives, the General Assembly now appears to be a tough nut to crack on
the subject. Although in practice, most member states do not impose capital
punishment, for a variety of reasons relating to geo-political issues and regional
alliances, it is difficult to build a political majority within the General Assembly for
abolitionist proposals.
IlH. INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW
The first truly international trials were held in the aftermath of the Second
World War, and led, in many cases, to executions. 89 The Charter of the International
Military Tribunal9° authorized the Nuremberg court to impose upon a convicted war
criminal "death or such other punishment as shall be determined by it to be just."'"
Many of the Nazi defendants were condemned to death, although a few received
lengthy prison terms and some were acquitted. At the Tokyo Trial, seven defen-
dants were sentenced to death and fifteen to life imprisonment.92 The president of
the Tokyo Tribunal penned a separate opinion which seemed to favor sentences
other than death:
It may well be that the punishment of imprisonment for life
under sustained conditions of hardship in an isolated place or
places outside Japan - the usual conditions in such cases -
would be a greater deterrent to men like the accused that the
speedy termination of existence on the scaffold or before a firing
squad.93
In 1989, the General Assembly initiated work in the International Law
Commission aimed at the establishment of an international court. When the issue
of sentencing came before the International Law Commission in 1991, special
rapporteur Doudou Thiam declared that capital punishment should be excluded from
" See William A. Schabas, War Crimes, Crimes Against Humanity and the Death
Penalty, 60 ALB. L. REv. 733, 736 (1997).
9 See Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of Major War Criminals of the
European Axis, Charter of the International Military Tribunal (LM.T.), art. 27,82 U.N.T.S.
279 (1951).
9, Special Proclamation by the Supreme Commanderfor the Allied Powers at Tokyo, art.
16, 4 BEVANS 20, as amended, art. 16, 4 BEVANS 27.
92 United States v. Araki (1948), reprinted in 2 THE TOKYO JUDGMENT: THE
INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST (I.M.T.F.E.) 527 (B.V.A. ROLNG
& C.F. ROTER eds., 1977).
" Id. at 478. See also B.V.A. ROLiNG, THE TOKYO TRIAL AND BEYOND: REFLECTIONS
OF A PEACEMONGER 98 (Antonio Cassese ed., 1993).
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the Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind, and that a maxi-
mum sentence of life imprisonment be provided.' Although a few Commission
members argued that the supreme penalty should not be abandoned,95 the vast
majority felt it would be unthinkable, given the international trend in favor of
abolishing the death penalty.
While the debate had been underway in the International Law Commission and
the Preparatory Committee, the Security Council had also addressed the issue of
sentencing when it set up the ad hoc tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and
Rwanda. The statutes of the two ad hoc tribunals contain brief provisions regarding
sentencing, essentially proposing that sentences be limited to imprisonment (thereby
tacitly excluding the death penalty, as well as corporal punishment, imprisonment
with hard labor, and fines) and that they be established taking into account the
general practice of the criminal courts in the former Yugoslavia or Rwanda, as the
case may be."
The death penalty is formally excluded from the Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court, which entered into force on July 1, 2002. The
exclusion of the death penalty from the Rome Statute is an important benchmark in
an unquestionable trend towards the universal abolition of capital punishment.97
IV. INTERNATIONAL NORMS AND DOMESTIC LAW
International standards with respect to capital punishment are increasingly
influential before domestic courts. Courts of several states, including South Africa,98
9' See Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/435 and
Add. 1, § 29 (1991). For the discussion of this proposal by the International Law Commission,
see Summary Records of the 2207th-2214th Meetings, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SR.2207-14,
and U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/Ser.A/1991/Add.1 (Part 2), and Report of the International Law
Commission on the Work of its Forty-third Session, A/46/10, §§ 70-105.
" Summary Records of the 2211th Meeting, U.N. Doc. AICN.4/SR.221 1, § 15 (1991);
Summary Records of the 2212th Meeting, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SR.2212, § 19, § 28 (1991);
Summary Records of the 2213th Meeting, U.N. Doc. AICN.4/SR.2213, § 55 (1991). Special
rapporteur Thiam promised that the Commission's report would state that "two or three of
its members" had expressed reservations about exclusion of the death penalty. See U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/SR.2213, § 59 (1991).
6 Statute of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for
Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the
Former Yugoslavia Since 1991, S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3217th mtg., U.N.
Doc. S/RES/827 (1993), art. 24; Statute of the International Tribunal for Rwanda, S.C. Res.
955, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453d mtg. at 3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (1994), art. 23, § 1.
97 Question of the Death Penalty, C.H.R. Res. 1999/61, pmbl.
98 State v. Makwanyane, 1995 (3) SARL 391 (CC) (S. Aft.), reprinted in 16 HuM. RTS.
L.J. 154 (1995).
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Zimbabwe,99 Canada,"° Hungary,' °' Tanzania,'0 2 Bosnia and Herzegovina' 13 and
the United Kingdom"° have found international law to be particularly helpful in the
interpretation of such notions as the right to life, and cruel, inhuman, and degrading
punishment. Often, judges use the UN resolutions and the treaty provisions as
persuasive authority for the application of domestic constitutions. All around the
world, courts and lawmakers increasingly look to other courts and legislatures for
guidance. The synergy between them has driven the debate. When Canada's
Supreme Court reversed itself on the issue of the death penalty in 2001, the evolving
international debate weighed heavily and perhaps decisively on the minds of the
judges. The Court wrote:
The existence of an international trend against the death
penalty is useful in testing our values against those of compara-
ble jurisdictions. This trend against the death penalty supports
some relevant conclusions. First, criminal justice, according to
international standards, is moving in the direction of abolition of
the death penalty. Second, the trend is more pronounced among
democratic states with systems of criminal justice comparable to
our own. The United States (or those parts of it that have
retained the death penalty) is the exception, although of course
it is an important exception. Third, the trend to abolition in the
democracies, particularly the Western democracies, mirrors and
perhaps corroborates the principles of fundamental justice that
led to the rejection of the death penalty in Canada. 5
The Supreme Court of Canada was particularly impressed with evidence of the
danger of executing an innocent person. This issue was not addressed in Kindler v.
Canada"° and, to be fair, it has emerged as a central theme in the death penalty
debate only within the past decade. Technological advances, principally the possi-
9 Catholic Comm'n for Justice & Peace in Zimb. v. Attorney-General, 1993 (4) SALR
239 (Zimb.), reprinted in 14 HuM. RTs. L.J. 323 (1993).
10 United States v. Burns, [2001] S.C.R. 183.
101 Alkotmanybirosag [Hungarian Constitutional Court], Dec. No. 23/1990 (X.3 1) AB
(Oct. 24, 1990), in MK., Oct. 31, 1991, translated in 1 E. EUR. CASE REP. CONST. L. 177
(1994).
102 See Republic v. Mbushuu, [1994] 2 L.R.C. 335 (Tanz. High Court).
103 See Damjanovic v. Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, CH/96/30, Decisions and
Reports 1996-1997, at 147.
14 See Pratt v. Attorney General for Jam., [1994] 2 A.C. 1 (P.C. 1993) (appeal taken from
Jam.), reprinted in 14 Hum. Rts. L.J. 338 (1993).
105 United States v. Burns, [2001] S.C.R. 183, at para. 92.
'0 Kindler v. Canada, [1991] S.C.R. 779.
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bility of DNA testing, have facilitated revelations about miscarriages of justice.
Within the United States, there is now substantial literature on the subject. °7
Several erstwhile enthusiasts for capital punishment in the political sphere have
"blinked" on this issue. Perhaps the most celebrated development is the moratorium
ordered by Governor George H. Ryan of Illinois in late 1999, a move that was
followed in January 2003 by his systematic commutation of death row prisoners.0 8
Following the Burns ruling by the Supreme Court of Canada, the Constitutional
Court of South Africa tackled a similar issue. In 1995, the South African Court
issued a landmark ruling holding capital punishment to be inconsistent with the
post-apartheid interim constitution's protection of the right to life and prohibition
of cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment or punishment. ' 9 In June 2001, the
same court granted a petition from Khalfan Khamis Mohamed, a participant in the
Al Qaeda bombing of the U.S. embassy in Dar es Salaam. After being arrested in
South Africa, Mohamed was summarily turned over to the FBI in what the state
called a deportation, although the court saw no reason to view it as anything but a
disguised extradition."0 According to the court:
In handing Mohamed over to the United States without securing
an assurance that he would not be sentenced to death, the
immigration authorities failed to give any value to Mohamed's
right to life, his right to have his human dignity respected and
protected and his right not to be subjected to cruel, inhuman or
degrading punishment.1"'
But Mohamed was already on trial in New York when the Constitutional Court
issued its ruling. He was being tried jointly with an accomplice, Mahmoud Mahmud
Salim, who had been extradited to the United States from Germany subsequent to
a commitment from the United States that capital punishment would not be imposed.
107 E.g., MICHAELL. RADELETETAL., IN SPrrE OF INNOCENCE: ERRONEous CONvICTIONS
IN CAPITAL CASES (1992); BARRY SCHECK ET AL., ACTUAL INNOCENCE: FIVE DAYS TO
ExECUTION AND OTHER DISPATCHES FROM THE WRONGLY CONVICTED (2000); James S.
Liebman et al., CapitalAttrition: ErrorRates in Capital Cases, 1973-1995,78 TEx. L. REV.
1839 (2000).
"' Press Release, Governor George H. Ryan, Governor Ryan Declares Moratorium on
Executions, Will Appoint Commission to Review Capital Punishment System (Jan. 31,
2000), available at http://www.state.il.uslgov/press/OO/jan/morat.htm.
"o State v. Makwanyane, 1995 (3) SARL 391 (CC) (S. Afr.), reprinted in 16 HuM. RTS.
L.J. 154 (1995). The Court reaffirmed the validity of Makwanyane in light of the new
Constitution, in Mohamed v. President of the Republic of South Africa, 2001 (3) SARL 893
(CC), para. 39.
110 Mohamed, 2001 (3) SARL 893 (CC), paras. 40, 60.
.. Id. at para. 49.
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The South African Court noted the unfairness of the situation and refuted any
suggestion that the United States might not have provided the assurance had it
been sought.' As a remedy for the constitutional violation, the South African
Constitutional Court ordered "the full text of this judgment to be drawn to the
attention of and to be delivered to the Director or equivalent administrative head of
the Federal Court for the Southern District of New York as a matter of urgency.""
3
It noted in addition:
Not only is the learned judge presiding aware of these pro-
ceedings, but the very reason why they were instituted by the
applicants was said to be that our findings may have a bearing
on the case over which he is presiding. On the papers there is a
conflict of opinion as between one of the defense lawyers on the
one hand and a member of the prosecution team on the other,
both of whom have filed affidavits expressing their respective
views as to the admissibility and/or cogency in the criminal
proceedings of any finding we might make. It is for the presiding
judge to determine such issues. For that purpose he may or may
not wish to have regard to disputed material such as our
findings. It is therefore incumbent on this Court to ensure as
best it can that the trial judge is enabled to exercise his judicial
powers in relation to the proceedings in this Court ....
Apparently Judge Sand, who was presiding over the trial, had specially authorized
the use of funds for the court-appointed defense team to pursue Mohamed's interests
in South Africa, as the South African Constitutional Court observed."5
Within days of the Constitutional Court ruling, a New York jury found
Mohamed guilty of murder. Under federal law, the jury then had to deliberate again
to decide whether or not Mohamed should be sentenced to death. Judge Sand took
the extraordinary step of informing the jury of the South African Constitutional
Court's views. The jury also knew that Salim, who had also been found guilty, could
not be sentenced to death because this had been a condition of his extradition from
Germany. On June 10, 2001, eleven of the twelve jurors concluded that "others of
equal or greater culpability in the murders [would] not be sentenced to death," which
is a mitigating factor under the applicable federal statute. Mohamed was given a
sentence of life imprisonment."'
112 Id. at paras. 44, 55.
"1 id. at para. 74.
"1 Id. at para. 71 (citation omitted).
115 Id.
116 United States v. Bin Laden, 156 F. Supp. 2d 359 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
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The refusal of abolitionist states to cooperate in the imposition of capital
punishment is increasingly manifesting itself in another related manner, namely the
denial of other forms of mutual legal assistance. For example, on November 27,
2002, French and German authorities agreed to provide evidence requested by the
United States in the prosecution of French national Zacarias Moussaoui for his
involvement in the September 11, 2001 attacks, after receiving an assurance that the
information would not be used to seek or impose the death penalty." 7 German
documents apparently provided information about the transfer of money from a man
alleged to have belonged to al Qaeda in Germany, Ramzi Binalshibh, to Moussaoui.
French documents depicted the childhood and early adulthood of Moussaoui in
France, and apparently assisted in establishing his connections with Muslim radicals.
The German embassy in Washington issued a statement on its website:
The German government will meet the request for legal
assistance by the U.S. government in the case of French citizen
Zaccharias Moussaoui. The United States ofAmericahas assured,
that the evidence and the information submitted by Germany
will not directly or indirectly be used against the defendant nor
against a third party towards the imposition of the death penalty.
... The German constitution (Art.2, par. 1; Art. 102), which
prohibits the imposition of the death penalty or any submittance
of material that might lead to the capital punishment. The U.S.
government has acknowledged this legal position with the
aforementioned assurance." 8
In December 2002, the European Union reached a deal allowing the United States
to obtain personal data from the Europol law enforcement agency on suspects. The
agreement was described by journalists as a "breakthrough" that resulted when the
United States accepted that European Union members would not be expected to
surrender suspects if they could face the death penalty. 19
"' Dan Eggen, U.S. to Get Moussaoui Data from Europe, WASH. POST, Nov. 28, 2002,
at A19; Christopher Marquis, Germany Agrees to Share Evidence Against 9/11 Defendant,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 28, 2002, at A18; Bruce Zagaris, Germans and French Agree to Give
Evidence in Moussaoui Case, 19 INT'L ENFORCEMENT L. REPORTER 21 (2003).
"' Press Release, German Embassy in the United States, Germany Gives Legal Assistance
in the Moussaoui Case (Nov. 20, 2002), at http://www.germanyinfo.org/relaunch/politics/
new/pol-terror-trial3.html (last visited Jan. 12, 2005).
"' Ian Black, EU Agrees to Pass on Intelligence to FBI, GuARDIAN (London), Dec. 20,
2002, at 12; Press Release, Europol, USA and Europol Sign a Full Co-operation Agreement
(Dec. 20, 2002), at http://www.europol.eu.int/index.asp?page=news&news=pr02l220.htm
(last visited Jan. 12, 2005).
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CONCLUSION
Human rights law - the Universal Declaration and the treaties that followed -
has become the touchstone for new constitutions and for the case law of
constitutional courts. The phenomenon is one of legal globalisation, and is
promoting moves to limit and eliminate the death penalty in those countries where
it still exists. There are many paths to abolition. In Ireland, it was by referendum
when, on May 31, 2001, some sixty-three percent of voters supported a constitu-
tional amendment prohibiting capital punishment. 2 In South Africa, Albania, and
Ukraine it has been by Constitutional Court judgment. In Russia, it was by
executive fiat. In Turkey, it was by legislation. There appears to be no formula to
follow as each country finds its own path to a civilised and humane system of
criminal law. But in all of these recent cases of abolition of the death penalty,
probably the most significant single impetus has been the dynamism of international
human rights law.
'20 Twenty-first Amendment of the Constitution Act, No.2 (2001) (Ir.) (forbidding the
Oireachtas, Ireland's Legislature, from enacting "any law providing for the imposition of the
death penalty"). The death penalty was abolished in Ireland by statute eleven years earlier.
Criminal Justice Act (1990) (Ir.) ("No person shall suffer death for any offence.").
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